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Abstract
Controlled Legal German (CLG) is a subset of legal German specifically designed to facilitate the semantic processing of Swiss statutes
and regulations. In this paper, we describe the strategies CLG employs to reduce ambiguity and underspecification in such texts, and the
methods it uses to maintain proximity to conventional legal language. The presented discussion suggests that, if existing synergies are
properly exploited, the concept of controlled natural language can be of benefit to the semantic processing of legal texts as well as to
legislative drafting.
1. Introduction
The last two decades have brought substantial progress in
the development of formal logical representations of legal
knowledge and of methods to perform automated legal rea-
soning with these representations (Rissland et al., 2003).
However, as McCarty (2007, p. 217) observes,
[o]ne of the main obstacles to progress in the
field of artificial intelligence and law is the nat-
ural language barrier. Since the raw materials
of the law are embodied in natural language –
cases, statutes, regulations, etc. – the designer of
a knowledge-based legal information system to-
day must translate them, by hand, into a formal
language, just to get started.
Since a manual translation of legal texts into formal logi-
cal representations is both time-consuming and error-prone,
the employment of natural language processing techniques
seems to be the only viable option to bridge the gap be-
tween legal texts and knowledge-based legal information
systems. While state-of-the-art methods of natural lan-
guage processing have come to deliver fairly decent results
(McCarty, 2007), they continue to struggle with the notori-
ously difficult resolution of natural language ambiguity and
underspecification.
The Collegis project (Controlled Language for Legal Infor-
mation Systems) addresses this problem from the perspec-
tive of legislative drafting. We develop Controlled Legal
German (CLG), a restricted version of Swiss legal German
specifically designed to facilitate the semantic processing
of statutes and regulations.
Controlled languages restrict the vocabulary, syntax and/or
semantics of a natural language in order to reduce its ambi-
guity and complexity. While early versions of controlled
languages were mainly devised to improve the readabil-
ity and translatability of texts, recently, the method has
been used to define subsets of natural languages that can
be unambiguously translated into formal logic (Pool, 2006;
Fuchs et al., 2008). Controlled languages have been devel-
oped for the domains of technical documentation and re-
quirements engineering and for general-purpose knowledge
representation. There have also been first attempts to ap-
ply the method to defining business rules (Spreeuwenberg
and Anderson Healy, 2009) and writing contracts (Pace and
Rosner, 2009).
In this paper, we build on a proposal by Hoey and Walter
(1988) and introduce legislative drafting as another promis-
ing area of application. Legislative drafting, by definition,
already exerts a certain degree of control on legal language,
thereby pursuing aims similar to those of controlled lan-
guages: the reduction of ambiguity and sufficient specifi-
cation of rules. While there have been studies on improv-
ing the understandability of legal language (Wydick, 2005;
Neumann, 2009), no controlled legal language has as yet
been developed for the purpose of facilitating automated
semantic processing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
first give an overview of the rationale behind CLG and the
methods it applies. After detailing the aims of CLG (section
2), we introduce the methods it uses (section 3) and illus-
trate with a specific example how these methods are applied
(section 4). Afterwards, we demonstrate how CLG exploits
conventions that already exist in Swiss legal language (sec-
tion 5) and discuss approaches to controlling underspeci-
fication in statutes and regulations (section 6). After de-
scribing the current state of development of CLG (section
7), we conclude with the presentation of a brief proposal
for the evaluation of controlled legal languages (section 8)
and with a discussion of the potential and limitations of the
approach for both semantic processing of legal texts and
legislative drafting (section 9).
2. Aim
The goal we pursue with the development of CLG is to pro-
vide a language for Swiss statutes and regulations whose
semantics can be understood by humans and processed by
computers. To allow for an automatic translation of such
texts into formal logical representations which can e.g. be
fed to some automated inference system, CLG aims at re-
ducing natural language ambiguity. However, while CLG
eliminates lexical ambiguity in function words and law-
specific expressions, it leaves the interpretation of content
words to the terminology databases and ontologies of its
users. CLG does therefore not infringe on the often in-
tended vagueness and open-textured nature of the concepts
represented by content words (Gardner, 1987). Like other
controlled languages that aim at providing an interface to
some sort of formal logic, such as ACE (Fuchs et al., 2008)
or PENG (Schwitter and Tilbrook, 2006), CLG is mainly
concerned with the reduction of syntactic and semantic am-
biguity.
Syntactic ambiguity occurs in situations where a sentence
can be assigned more than one syntactic structure. Typical
examples are so-called attachment ambiguities: in sentence
(1), the prepositional phrase im Bereich der Logistik (‘in the
sector of logistics’) could theoretically be attached to deckt
(‘supplies’), to Bedarf (‘need’), to Gu¨ter und Dienstleis-
tungen (‘goods and services’), or only to Dienstleistungen
(‘services’).
(1) Das Bundesgericht deckt seinen Bedarf an Gu¨tern
und Dienstleistungen im Bereich der Logistik
selbsta¨ndig. (Art. 25a Abs. 2 BGG1)
‘The Federal Supreme Court supplies its need for
goods and services in the sector of logistics
autonomously.’
Semantic ambiguity, on the other hand, occurs if a sentence
has only one syntactic structure but can be assigned two
or more non-equivalent logical representations. A typical
example is scope ambiguity. Without contextual knowl-
edge, it cannot be determined whether sentence (2) requires
that each representative (or rather the representatives of
each party) show a separate letter of attorney, or whether
it means that they should provide one letter of attorney to-
gether.
(2) Die Parteivertreter und -vertreterinnen haben sich
durch eine Vollmacht auszuweisen. (Art. 40 Abs. 2
BGG)
‘The party representatives have to identify themselves
with a letter of attorney. ’
Besides reducing ambiguity, CLG aims at preventing types
of underspecification that warrant unintended inferences.
This goal is described in more detail in section 6.
3. Methods
Generally, controlled natural languages use the following
methods to reduce natural language ambiguity and com-
plexity:
• Construction rules
Construction rules restrict the number of words and
constructions that can be used, thus prohibiting the use
of specific ambiguous words and constructions.
• Interpretation rules
Interpretation rules assign default interpretations to the
remaining ambiguous words and constructions.
• Paraphrases
Paraphrases suggest alternative ways of expressing the
respective other meaning of an originally ambiguous
word or construction.
1Bundesgerichtsgesetz (Federal Supreme Court Act), SR
173.100
One of the main problems of the method of controlled nat-
ural language is the fact that there is a trade-off between
the level of control a language exhibits (and thus its pro-
cessability) and its expressiveness, naturalness and user-
friendliness. Most existing controlled natural languages,
especially those aspiring to provide an interface to some
kind of formal logic, consequently have only very limited
expressiveness, and several of them include constructions
which border on naturalness at best (Pool, 2006). CLG
differs from these languages as it needs to be expressive
enough to render the contents of statutes and regulations,
and natural enough to be understood and accepted by non-
expert human readers. We employ three methods to maxi-
mize CLG’s proximity to ordinary legal language:
• Syntactic sugar
As the naturalness of specific control mechanisms may
vary from context to context, CLG usually provides
more than one way of controlling an individual phe-
nomenon.
• Variable-depth control
For certain phenomena, CLG provides multiple lev-
els of control, which can be switched on or off by the
user, depending on the requirements of the target ap-
plication.
If further specificity is not required, certain ambiguous
constructions are only assigned underspecified logical
representations. The treatment of such constructions
is then left to the tools that process the logical repre-
sentations.2
• Interactive control
Some phenomena are not controlled statically but re-
solved dynamically by providing an authoring tool
that asks the user to specify the intended meaning
upon each occurrence of the respective ambiguous
construction (Macias and Pulman, 1995).
To guarantee transparency, the choices made by the
user are recorded in a so-called disambiguation proto-
col, which is to be stored together with the text.
In the next section, we illustrate with a specific example
how these methods are applied.
4. Applying the methods
In Swiss statutes and regulations, indefinite noun phrases in
subject position usually indicate what the respective norm
is about, i.e. they introduce the “subject matter” of the norm
(Caussignac et al., 2000). However, the indefinite article
(ein/eine/ein ‘a(n)’ in singular; ∅ in plural) is ambiguous
at this position: it can have an existential interpretation, as
in example (3), or a generic interpretation, as in example
(4), which can be represented as universal quantification
(Gamut, 1991; Cohen, 2001).3
2Attempto Controlled English (Fuchs et al., 2008) uses this
method for plural ambiguities and copula; Computer Processable
Language (Clark et al., 2005) employs it for PP-attachment ambi-
guities.
3In statutes and regulations, the generic interpretation of the
indefinite article does not express the prototypical features of a
(3) Ein Mitglied der Universita¨tsleitung fu¨hrt den Vorsitz.
(§ 67 Abs. 2 UniO UZH4)
‘A member of the Executive Board of the University
acts as chair.’
∃x : member(x) ∧ ...
(4) Ein Titel [...] kann von der Erweiterten
Universita¨tsleitung auf Antrag der Fakulta¨t entzogen
werden, wenn die Inhaberin oder der Inhaber die
Interessen der Universita¨t ernsthaft verletzt.
(§ 8 Abs. 7 UniO UZH)
‘A title [...] can be revoked by the Extended
Executive Board of the University at the request of
the faculty if the holder seriously violates the interests
of the university.’
∀x : title(x)→ ...
One way to control this ambiguity is to define a construc-
tion rule that prohibits the use of the indefinite article ein al-
together and to offer paraphrases for its two interpretations
in order to maintain the expressiveness of the language. An
existentially quantified subject matter could be introduced
by mindestens ein (‘at least one’) or genau ein (‘exactly
one’); for a universally quantified subject matter, one could
use the determiner jeder (‘every’). The problem with this
solution is that it represents a significant deviation from
conventional legal language, where the use of ein is very
common while the use of mindestens/genau ein and jeder
is rare and more marked. Adopting this construction rule
would thus substantially decrease the naturalness of CLG.
The solution at the other end of the scale is to resolve the
ambiguity caused by the use of ein interactively, i.e. to
devise an authoring system that asks the user to indicate
for every occurrence of a subject matter introduced by ein
whether existential or universal quantification is intended.
However, while interactive control is a viable option for rel-
atively rare phenomena, it is clearly not user-friendly for
phenomena that occur as frequently as the indefinite arti-
cle. This solution too must be rejected.
The only remaining method of control is the definition of an
interpretation rule that identifies one of the two readings of
ein as the default interpretation. In statutes and regulations,
indefinite plural noun phrases in subject position generally
exhibit a generic reading and are thus to be represented as
universally quantified. Sentence (5) provides an example.
(5) Dienstleistungen sind in der Regel mindestens
kostendeckend in Rechnung zu stellen.
(§ 3 Abs. 3 UniO UZH)
‘Services usually have to be charged so that at least
the costs covered.’
∀x : service(x)→ ...
kind but states a rule that applies to every instance of that kind.
– This observation can be conceived as a CLG interpretation rule
defining that the generic reading of the indefinite article is inter-
preted as universal quantification.
4Universita¨tsordnung der Universita¨t Zu¨rich (University Reg-
ulation of the University of Zurich), SR 415.111
As CLG aims at staying close to conventional legal lan-
guage, it would make little sense to define the existen-
tial reading as the default interpretation of indefinite plural
noun phrases. For indefinite singular noun phrases, nei-
ther interpretation can be considered conventional. To keep
the number of rules that users of CLG need to master low,
we apply one and the same interpretation rule to both the
singular and the plural version of the indefinite article: in-
definite noun phrases are interpreted as universally quanti-
fied in subject position (and as existentially quantified else-
where; see section 7).
The definition of such an interpretation rule entails that ex-
ample (3) needs to re-phrased to obtain existential quantifi-
cation. Two options are available. The first is to make the
existential quantification explicit by using determiners such
as mindestens ein (‘at least one’) or genau ein (‘exactly
one’). In the present example, however, these determiners
do not sound particularly natural and potentially confuse
the reader as they seem to be marked pragmatically:
(6) Genau ein Mitglied der Universita¨tsleitung fu¨hrt den
Vorsitz.
‘Exactly one member of the Executive Board of the
University acts as chair.’
Alternatively, the noun phrase ein Mitglied der Univer-
sita¨tsleitung can be moved away from the subject position.
This effect can be achieved by using a passive construction
such as (7). For the present example, this second solution
provides a sentence that both feels natural and is interpreted
in the intended way in CLG.
(7) Die Forschungskommission wird von einem Mitglied
der Universita¨tsleitung pra¨sidiert.
‘The research committee is chaired by a member of
the Executive Board of the University.’
Sentence (7) is preferable to (3) not just from the perspec-
tive of semantic processing but also from the perspective
of legislative drafting. First, the subject of a norm should
usually indicate what this norm is about. The present norm
is not about some member of the Executive Board of the
University but about the research committee. Second, the
rephrased version indicates explicitly what the chair is of
(namely the research committee); in the original version,
this information has to be inferred from the context. We
come back to such phenomena of underspecification in sec-
tion 6.
Depending on their target application, some users of CLG
may not want to commit to the aforementioned interpre-
tation rules. Answer extraction, for instance, can cope
without the explicit specification of quantification (Molla´,
2001). As CLG pursues a policy of variable-depth control,
it therefore also provides the option of leaving the quan-
tification of indefinite noun phrases underspecified. In that
case, the aforementioned interpretation rules do not apply.
5. Exploiting domain-specific conventions
Since its aims are similar to those of controlled natural lan-
guage, conventional legal language itself provides mecha-
nisms to control certain types of ambiguity. Whenever pos-
sible, CLG exploits these already existing mechanisms.
CLG makes, for instance, use of the fact that some words
and constructions that are ambiguous in full natural lan-
guage have acquired a default interpretation in legal lan-
guage. In ordinary German, the adverb grundsa¨tzlich,
modifying an obligation or permission, can have two di-
rectly opposed interpretations: if interpreted in the sense
of ‘strictly’ or ‘categorically’, it denotes that the respective
rule does not allow for exceptions; if interpreted as ‘gen-
erally’ or ‘in principle’, it indicates that the rule allows
for exceptions, which is particularly relevant in the con-
text of defeasible reasoning. By convention, grundsa¨tzlich
is always used in the latter sense in Swiss legal German.
CLG therefore devises an interpretation rule defining that
grundsa¨tzlich is always interpreted as indicating the admis-
sibility of exceptions:
(8) Die Vero¨ffentlichung der Entscheide hat
grundsa¨tzlich in anonymisierter Form zu erfolgen.
(Art. 27 Abs. 2 BGG)
‘In principle, the decisions must be published in
anonymized form.’
Note that unlike ordinary adverbs, grundsa¨tzlich does not
modify the verb but the obligation as a whole. CLG defines
a number of words and fixed expressions that are not inter-
preted like other items of the same grammatical category
but obtain domain-specific interpretations. Table 1 lists the
most common of them.
Another example of a phenomenon for which CLG exploits
existing domain-specific methods of control is attachment
ambiguity in complex coordination structures. Sentences
like (9) are difficult to parse not only for computers but
also for humans. It is thus in the best interest of both NLP
and legislative drafting to control the attachment ambigui-
ties they contain.
(9) In Fu¨nferbesetzung entscheiden sie ferner u¨ber
Beschwerden gegen referendumspflichtige kantonale
Erlasse und gegen kantonale Entscheide u¨ber die
Zula¨ssigkeit einer Initiative oder das Erfordernis
eines Referendums. (Art. 20 Abs. 3 BGG)
‘In a composition of five, they furthermore decide on
appeals against cantonal decrees subject to
referendum and against cantonal decisions on the
admissibility of an initiative or the necessity of a
referendum.’
CLG defines an interpretation rule stating that constituents
are always attached to the closest possible candidate. While
this rule can be easily applied to relatively simple sen-
tences, it is clearly not user-friendly enough, both in terms
of writability and readability, for complex coordination
structures such as (9). To disambiguate such structures,
CLG includes a means provided by conventional legal lan-
guage: ellipses are removed by repeating all elements in
each conjunct (in this case, the phrase kantonale Entscheide
‘cantonal decisions’ is repeated) and the conjuncts are listed
in enumerations introduced by letters, as shown in (10).
(10) In Fu¨nferbesetzung entscheiden sie ferner u¨ber
Beschwerden gegen:
a. referendumspflichtige kantonale Erlasse;
b. kantonale Entscheide u¨ber die Zula¨ssigkeit einer
Initiative;
c. kantonale Entscheide u¨ber das Erfordernis eines
Referendums.
‘In a composition of five, they furthermore decide on
appeals against:
a. cantonal decrees subject to referendum;
b. cantonal decisions on the admissibility of an
initiative;
c. cantonal decisions on the necessity of a
referendum.’
6. Controlling underspecification
Besides ambiguity, underspecification is the main issue that
a controlled legal language needs to address. We can dis-
tinguish two types of underspecification in statutes and reg-
ulations.
The first type occurs where legislators deliberately refrain
from specifying certain details. Sentence (11) may serve as
an example.
(11) Die Bundesversammlung wa¨hlt die Richter und
Richterinnen. (Art. 5 Abs. 1 BGG)
‘The Federal Assembly elects the judges.’
In general, plural noun phrases can have a distributive read-
ing (each judge is elected individually) and a collective
reading (the judges are elected as a body).5 As the dis-
tributive interpretation is far more frequent in statutes and
regulations, CLG defines it as the default interpretation. To
express the collective reading, a singular term has to be
used (e.g. das Gericht ‘the court’). This strategy can also
be frequently found in existing legal texts. However, even
with such an interpretation rule being applied, sentence (11)
remains indeterminate: it does not specify the exact condi-
tions under which an individual judge is considered elected.
Even if the Federal Assembly elected the judges as a body,
each judge might considered elected individually by this
act. The legislator deliberately leaves the conditions under
which a judge needs to be elected undetermined here; CLG
reflects this fact despite the application of an interpretation
rule.
The second type of underspecification poses a much more
substantial problem to the semantic processing of statutes
and regulations. It occurs in passages that warrant unin-
tended inferences if they are not further specified and that
are therefore potentially harmful to correct automated rea-
soning. Sentence (12) is an example.
(12) Bei der Geburt eines Kindes hat der Angestellte
Anspruch auf eine einmalige Zulage von 530
Franken. (Art. 55 Abs. 1 AngO ETH-Bereich6)
‘Upon the birth of a child, the employee is entitled to
a one-time allowance of 530 francs.’
5The treatment of plural ambiguities in controlled language is
thoroughly discussed in Schwertel (2000).
6Angestelltenordnung ETH-Bereich (Employee Regulation
ETH-Domain), SR 172.221.106.2
Word / Expression Translation Function
muss/mu¨ssen, hat/haben zu∗ must, have to marks a rule as an obligation
darf/du¨rfen, kann/ko¨nnen∗ may, can marks a rule as a permission
grundsa¨tzlich, in der Regel∗ in principle indicates that a rules allows for exceptions
gema¨ss, im Rahmen (von) according to, within the scope (of) indicates the applicability of another rule
(gilt) sinngema¨ss (applies) analogously indicates that a rule is applicable in adapted form
insbesondere, namentlich∗ in particular indicates that a specific case is made explicit
bei (+NP) upon (+NP), ∼if condition in the form of a PP; cf. example (12)
Table 1: Examples of function words and fixed expressions with conventionalized domain-specific interpretations. (Ex-
pressions marked with an asterisk are contained in CLG 1.0; cf. section 7.)
The problem sentence (12) poses for semantic processing
is that the condition (at the birth of a child) apparently does
not share any discourse referent with the consequence (the
employee is entitled to a one-time allowance of 530 francs).
The sentence does not specify explicitly that the employee
does not receive an allowance on the occasion of the birth
of just any child but only if he or she is the parent of that
child. Human readers will easily infer this missing bit of
information from the context and thus reduce the number
of warranted inferences. An automated reasoner, on the
other hand, may in the worst case combine the logical rep-
resentation of (12) with the fact that approximately 216,000
children are born every day, and deduce that an employee is
to receive total allowances of 114,480,000 francs per day.
To avoid this problem, a controlled legal language may pre-
scribe that the condition of a conditional norm always has
to share a discourse referent with its consequence. This re-
quirement can be fulfilled, for instance, by augmenting the
condition with a relative clause:
(13) Bei der Geburt eines Kindes, gegenu¨ber dem er
elterliche Pflichten hat, hat der Angestellte Anspruch
auf eine einmalige Zulage von 530 Franken.
‘Upon the birth of a child toward whom he or she has
parental duties, the employee is entitled to a one-time
allowance of 530 francs.’
The same effect is achieved if another condition is added at
the end of the sentence:
(14) Bei der Geburt eines Kindes hat der Angestellte
Anspruch auf eine einmalige Zulage von 530
Franken, sofern er gegenu¨ber dem Kind elterliche
Pflichten hat.
‘Upon the birth of a child, the employee is entitled to
a one-time allowance of 530 francs, provided that he
or she has parental duties toward the child.’
Note that the application of this rule is not only beneficial
to semantic processing but also to legislative drafting. Had
they been forced to provide the additional specification, leg-
islators would have become aware of an overlooked regu-
latory loophole, namely that biological parents who are not
liable for support should not be entitled to an allowance
while foster parents should.
An alternative solution to controlling the phenomenon be-
comes available if one recognizes that the noun Kind
(‘child’) is in fact ambiguous: it can denote a young human,
or it can denote someone’s direct offspring. In the latter
sense, Kind is a relational noun, whose logical representa-
tion takes not one but two arguments: child of (x , y). The
noun Kind is thus implicitly anaphoric, referring to some
other entity in the text.7 The problem is then to constrain
the field of potential antecedents so that the implicit refer-
ence is unambiguous. The guidelines for legislative draft-
ing provided by the Swiss Confederation (BJ, 2007) and by
the Canton of Zurich (ZH, 2005) constrain the use of pro-
nouns – another type of anaphoric references – in statutes
and regulations: pronouns may only refer to entities within
the same article and they may only refer to either the subject
of the main clause or to the subject of the immediately pre-
ceding sentence. The same rule can now be applied to the
implicit anaphoric references created by relational nouns:
their use may be constrained to referring to either the sub-
ject of the main clause (as is the case in our example) or,
if they are part of that subject themselves, to the subject
of the immediately preceding sentence – provided that that
sentence is in the same article as the sentence containing the
relational noun. It needs to be said, however, that this rule
is not yet implemented in CLG 1.0, the version of the lan-
guage representing the current state of development, which
we will briefly describe in the next section.
7. State of development
The state of development of Controlled Legal German is
reflected in version 1.0 of the language, which is docu-
mented in Hoefler and Bu¨nzli (2010). CLG 1.0 provides
the basic syntactic and semantic inventory to express sim-
ple norms (obligations, permissions, prohibitions; includ-
ing norms stating duties and responsibilities) as well as le-
gal definitions. Example (15) provides a typical CLG 1.0
sentence and the logical representation it maps onto.
(15) Radfahrer mu¨ssen mindestens zwei rote Ru¨ckstrahler
tragen, sofern sie keine Ausnahmebewilligung haben.
‘Cyclists must wear at least two red reflectors, unless
they have (if they do not have) a certificate of
exception.’
O ∀x : [radfahrer(x ) ∧
¬∃y : [ausnahmebewilligung(y) ∧
∃e : has(e, x , y)]
→ ∃≥2 z : [roter rueckstrahler(z ) ∧
∃f : traegt(f , x , z )]]
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
Sentence (15) illustrates the following characteristics of the
formal semantics underlying version 1.0 of Controlled Le-
gal German. CLG 1.0 can be unambiguously mapped onto
predicate logic representations that are augmented with de-
ontic operators for obligation (O), permission (P) and pro-
hibitions (¬P). Since content words are translated into
predicate symbols, the potential open-texturedness of the
concepts they represent is preserved. The events and states
represented by verbs are reified (and quantified). Adjec-
tives used in an attributive manner and the nouns they mod-
ify are, for now, contracted into a single logical predicate.
CLG 1.0 includes means to express existential and univer-
sal quantification, as well as counting quantifiers. It does,
however, not include elements of temporal and intensional
logics. These concepts are planned to be added to the stan-
dard in CLG versions 2.x and 3.x respectively.
The following list provides an overview of the range of syn-
tactic constructions that are available in CLG 1.0:
1. Only present tense is permitted.
2. Sentences have canonical word order (the subject pre-
ceding objects and adverbials).
3. Both active and passive voice are permitted.
4. Nouns can currently be modified by (a) adjectives, (b)
participle constructions, (c) relative clauses, but not by
prepositional phrases (with the exception of the prepo-
sitional phrase denoting the agent of a nominalized
verb).
5. Verbs can be modified by (a) adverbs, (b) prepositional
phrases.
6. Main clauses may contain a modal verb; main clauses
without modal verb are assumed to be obligations.
7. Nouns, verbs and adjectives can be coordinated; coor-
dinations may be put in the form of enumerations (cf.
section 5).
8. Attributes in genitive case are only permitted to ex-
press the direct object of nominalized verbs or the
complements of relational nouns.
9. Conditional clauses and relative clauses are the only
permissible subordinate clauses.
10. Complement clauses and adverbial clauses are not per-
mitted (with the exception of conditional clauses).
11. There are special formulaic expressions to list duties
and responsibilities, such as e.g. X hat die folgenden
Aufgaben und Kompetenzen (‘X has the following du-
ties and responsibilities’).
The semantics of CLG 1.0 sentences is controlled by the
following seven interpretation rules:
1. Modal verbs have wide scope over the rest of the sen-
tence.
2. Subjects have wide scope over Objects and Adver-
bials.
3. Pronouns refer to the subject of the sentence or, if they
are part of the subject, to the subject of the immedi-
ately preceding sentence.
4. Indefinite noun phrases are interpreted generically if
they are the subject of a sentence and existentially
elsewhere.
5. Plurals are interpreted distributively. If a collective
reading is intended, a singular term has to be used.
6. Definite noun phrases presuppose existence and
uniqueness and are interpreted referentially. Definite
plurals are interpreted distributively and universally.
7. Attachment ambiguity is resolved by attaching the
constituent in question to the closest potential an-
tecedent; if that antecedent is a conjunct, the con-
stituent is attached to the whole coordination.
For a detailed account of CLG 1.0, we refer to Hoefler and
Bu¨nzli (2010). Evidently, CLG 1.0 is not yet expressive
enough to be used in legislative drafting. It can, however,
be employed to model simple norms in a way that provides
a formal specification and is yet understandable by non-
expert human readers.
8. Proposal for evaluation
As the development of CLG is still work in progress, a thor-
ough evaluation of the controlled natural language can not
yet be provided. In any case, before such an evaluation can
be undertaken, one needs to define how a controlled lan-
guage that aims at facilitating the semantic processing of
statutes and regulations is to be assessed in the first place.
We propose that such a controlled language has to be eval-
uated for the following criteria:
• Expressiveness
An ideal controlled legal language should be able to
express all propositions that conventional legal lan-
guage can express. The expressiveness of a controlled
legal language can be assessed by determining what
percentage of the content of a chosen statute or regula-
tion (e.g. how many of the individual norms contained
in that text) it can express.
• Proximity to conventional legal language
An ideal controlled legal language should be indistin-
guishable from conventional legal language in terms
of style. As a first approximation, the degree to which
a controlled legal language covers conventional legal
language can be evaluated by assessing how many arti-
cles of a chosen statute or regulation need to be altered
if that text is to be translated into the controlled lan-
guage. If only few passages have to be altered, the re-
spective controlled language can be considered stylis-
tically close to conventional legal language. However,
the need for rephrasing does not necessarily imply
that the resulting text deviates from the conventions
of legal language. It may still be perfectly acceptable.
The stylistic acceptability of substantially altered texts
therefore requires additional assessment by human le-
gal editors.
As we have already pointed out above, the degree to
which a controlled language covers conventional le-
gal language can be maximized by the use of syntactic
sugar, the employment of control mechanisms that re-
flect the frequency distributions in the reference texts,
and the provision of authoring systems that allow for
certain phenomena to be disambiguated interactively.
Both criteria, expressiveness as well as proximity to con-
ventional legal language, can only be assessed in a con-
trolled legal language if a corpus of semantically analyzed
reference texts is available. We are currently building such
a corpus, starting with the Federal Supreme Court Act and
the Regulation of the University of Zurich, from which we
quoted in this paper.
9. Discussion and conclusion
The conditions encountered in legislative drafting seem
ideal for an application of controlled natural language.
Statutes and regulations are written in a highly convention-
alized language that contains restrictions aimed at prevent-
ing ambiguity. Due to this shared goal, the properties of
legal language are not unlike those of typical controlled nat-
ural languages. Controlled Legal German uses these syner-
gies to facilitate the drafting of statutes and regulations that
can be automatically translated into formal logical repre-
sentations. It thus attempts to bridge the gap between legal
texts, written in natural language, and knowledge-based le-
gal information systems, operating with formal logical rep-
resentations.
In this paper, we have presented the general rationale be-
hind CLG and introduced the methods it applies to prevent
ambiguities and underspecification. We have shown that
CLG consists of a set of recommendations in the form of
construction and interpretation rules of variable depth, ac-
companied by suggested paraphrases and options for inter-
active ambiguity resolution. These recommendations ex-
plain how statutes and regulations can be formulated in a
way that enables automatic semantic processing. In par-
allel to defining such rules, we are working on combining
them into a comprehensive formal description of a subset of
Swiss legal German that can be translated deterministically
into formal logical representations.
At this point, some remarks on the limitations of the ap-
proach of applying controlled natural language to legal
texts are in place. A first limitation of the approach pertains
to the availability of adequate logical representations for the
content expressed linguistically in norms. Not all linguistic
phenomena can easily be represented in formal logic: tem-
poral relations or intensional contexts, for instance, already
require a rather complex machinery of operators and ax-
ioms. But even apparently simple linguistic constructions
such as attributive genitives or opaque adjectives do not
have straightforward logical representations. There will al-
ways be some phenomena that have to be treated as “black
boxes” or modeled in a grossly simplified manner. Any
logical representation derived from a norm written in con-
trolled natural language will thus only capture the content
of that norm to a certain degree of granularity.
A second limitation of the approach refers to the fact that
controlled natural languages such as CLG, ACE or PENG
may be able to reduce (or, in the ideal case, eliminate) cer-
tain types of ambiguity but cannot (and do not aim to) re-
move vagueness. The predicates of any logical representa-
tion will still stand for concepts whose definition may be
vague or open-textured. On the one hand, this fact reflects
a reality of legal language, where vagueness and indetermi-
nacy is often positively intended (Nussbaumer, 2005). On
the other hand, it means that being able to derive a logical
representation from a legal text written in a controlled lan-
guage does not entail that one will automatically be able to
perform meaningful legal reasoning over such a represen-
tation. While certain inferences can be drawn purely on the
basis of the logical representations of a statute or regulation
by treating the logical predicates and the potentially vague
concepts they stand for as black boxes, deeper automated
reasoning will in addition at least require extensive ontolo-
gies modeling world knowledge.
A third limitation pertains to the controlled natural lan-
guage itself. It is to be expected that extensive control of
ambiguity will lead to a certain reduction of the expressive-
ness of legal language. The future development of CLG
will have to show whether this reduction can be kept at a
level at which it does not seriously impede the usability of
CLG for legislative drafting. While experience shows that
many types of ambiguity can be controlled by the methods
described, underspecification will continue to pose a prob-
lem. It will most likely not be possible for a controlled
language to prevent the vast number of situations in which
a human writer may underspecify some of the information
required for accurate reasoning.
Finally, the success of a controlled legal language will de-
pend on its acceptance by professional legal editors: CLG
must be easy to learn and close to conventional legal lan-
guage both in terms of the propositions it can express and
the stylistic means it provides. It is too early to specu-
late if it will be possible to develop a controlled version
of legal German that is accepted by its potential users. Us-
ing CLG for didactic purposes and for the conceptualiza-
tion of norms rather than for actual legislative drafting may
be a fallback strategy. However, there are three factors
that at least have the potential to exert a positive influence
on the acceptability of employing controlled natural lan-
guage in legislative drafting. First, professional legal ed-
itors are domain-specialists that are used to (and well ca-
pable of) following linguistic guidelines. The application
of such rules may be additionally supported by specifically
designed authoring tools (Schwitter et al., 2003). Second,
there is some chance that we will be able to show that the
employment of a controlled legal language can also be ben-
eficial to legislative drafting itself. In this paper, we have
briefly demonstrated how CLG can help legal editors de-
tect regulatory loopholes they would otherwise have over-
looked. Eventually, however, the acceptance of controlling
legal language for semantic processing will be served best
if it grants access to AI & Law applications of evident prac-
tical use beyond legislative drafting.
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